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Abstract
The challenge of self-optimization for orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access (OFDMA) inter-
ference channels is that users inherently compete harmfully and simultaneous water-filling (WF) would
lead to a Pareto-inefficient equilibrium. To overcome this, we first introduce the role of environmental
interference derivative in the WF optimization of the interactive OFDMA game and then study the en-
vironmental interference derivative properties of Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). Such properties provide
important insights to devise free OFDMA games for achieving various SEs, realizable by simultaneous
WF regulated by specifically chosen operational interference derivatives. We also present a definition of
all-Stackelberg-leader equilibrium (ASE) where users are all foresighted to each other, albeit each with
only local channel state information (CSI), and can thus most effectively reconcile their competition to
maximize the user rates. We show that under certain environmental conditions, the free games are both
unique and optimal. Simulation results reveal that our distributed ASE game achieves the performance
very close to the near-optimal centralized iterative spectrum balancing (ISB) method in [5].
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I. Introduction
Dynamic spectrum access enabled by cognitive radio technologies has recently attracted much attention
[1–3]. Of particular interest is the orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access (OFDMA) interference
channel model in which multiple communication links coexist and share a spectrum of frequency bands
dynamically without a centralized spectrum manager.1 The model is motivated by its suitability to analyze
multicell networks and the move of regulatory bodies in favor of liberalization and license-exempt spectrum
policies for higher utilization. In interference channels, often infrastructureless, users are all uncoordinated
individuals, and inherently compete with each other. How individuals gather sufficient network information
and optimize themselves to benefit not only their own but the entire network is an open challenge.
In this regard, game theory has emerged as a unique methodology to analyze a group of self-organized
mutually competing users and can be adopted to design autonomous access control methods for OFDMA,
e.g., [7–12]. However, as reviewed in [13], there are fundamental deadlocks that prevent existing results
from making substantial impacts. The first deadlock is the low efficiency of Nash equilibrium (NE) where
users are myopic and harmfully compete with each other [14]. NE is also not unique and its performance
is unpredictable. To avoid over-competition, Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) arises where foresighted users or
leaders can benefit more from the game, by knowing full CSI and the strategies of all other myopic users
or followers. In [15], one-leader SE (OSE) for OFDMA was studied revealing a large gain over NE.
Unfortunately, there are operational obstacles in achieving OSE. First, to be qualified as a leader, the
user should possess tremendous cognition capability, which, albeit, could be learned from the environment
by conjectures [16].2 Worse, obtaining the OSE would require playing a bi-level game,3 in which there is a
strict order of how the game proceeds to reach the designated equilibrium. For OFDMA of uncoordinated
users, this is unrealizable. Another long-standing issue is that OSE is not known to be unique.
The challenges do not end there, as there is strong desire to extend the SE framework to the cases
where multiple leaders coexist [16–19]. In [18], DeMiguel et al. studied the extension and in their definition
of K-SE (K leaders out of all users), leaders are myopic with respect to other leaders, but foresighted to
1For infrastructure-based communications where a centralized spectrum manager knowing full channel state information
(CSI) between every transmitter-receiver link is present, optimal approaches are well known [4–6], but they are hardly practical
for infrastructureless OFDMA systems if a large number of users are involved, let alone its susceptibility to CSI errors.
2Note that for OSE, while conjectural equilibrium (CE) can be used to make the leader learn the necessary network-wide
information, but it was acknowledged in [16] that extending it to K-SE scenarios is a topic for future investigation.
3To achieve OSE via a bi-level game, the leader will start his action first, wait for all the followers to play a sub-game to
reach an NE, then revise his action, and the whole process repeats until convergence. A bi-level game is needed even for CE.
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followers. To approach the K-SE, usual challenges in OSE remain. Further, according to their definition,
if all users are leaders, the game degenerates to an NE, losing the foresightedness advantages of the leaders,
making it inefficient for OFDMA systems. Most recently, K-SE was employed for femtocell communications
in [19] where strong assumptions on leaders such as full CSI4 and exhaustive optimization, apply.
The paper aims to achieve a truly self-optimized OFDMA network where every transmitter individually
optimizes its own power and subcarrier allocation, based on its local CSI and interference observations, for
maximizing the network rates. To this end, we first revisit the water-filling (WF) optimization of a user’s
parameters by introducing the role of interference derivative which measures the environmental changes
with respect to a change in the power allocation strategy of that user. We show that the environmental
interference derivative plays a crucial role in the uniqueness of the OFDMA game, and by analyzing the
environmental interference derivative property of NE and OSE, we can construct a free OSE game that
can be approached by simultaneous (or iterative) WF5 in an arbitrary order, regulated by an operational
interference derivative. As a final outcome, we present a new all-leader SE (ASE) definition under which
users are all foresighted to each other with their belief that others are myopic. By extending the analysis,
we devise a free ASE game that is achievable again by a regulated simultaneous WF interaction. We also
show that under certain environmental conditions, the proposed free games have unique equilibriums and
optimal. In the context of OFDMA, this paper has made the following major contributions:
• We provide a new sufficient condition for the uniqueness of NE.
• We prove that OSE is unique and a free OSE game can be constructed.
• We define a new ASE and propose a free ASE game which is unique under certain conditions.
• The free games can be achieved by simultaneous generalized WF (GWF) empowered by the specifi-
cally chosen operational interference derivatives, with the aid of only users’ local CSI.
• Simulation results reveal that the proposed free ASE game achieves the sum-rate very close to that
of the centralized iterative spectrum balancing (ISB) method for the OFDMA channel in [5].
• Our analysis provides the sufficient conditions for convergence to NE, OSE and ASE.
4In this paper, full CSI refers to the CSI knowledge of every transmitter-receiver link of the entire network, in contrast to
local CSI which we refer to it as the CSI only for a transmitter to its intended receiver.
5It is worth pointing out that in our proposed scheme, the WF solution incorporates the operational interference derivative
into it and is fundamentally different from the conventional WF and the modified WF in [20].
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II. Preliminaries
A. OFDMA Interference Channels
Consider a K-user OFDMA infrastructureless system, as shown in Fig. 1, where each user is free to occupy
any of the N orthogonal subcarriers for communications. The users operate in a non-cooperative manner
and inherently compete with each other. For user k, the total transmitted power is constrained by
N∑
n=1
pk[n] ≤ Pk, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, (1)
where pk[n] denotes the power allocated for the nth subchannel by user k and Pk denotes the maximum
total power for user k. We write pk , {pk[1], pk[2], . . . , pk[N ]} as the power allocation pattern of user k,
which is drawn from some power allocation strategy Pk, or denoted by pk ∈ Pk.
Let Hij [n] denote the flat-fading channel coefficient from transmitter i to receiver j and Nk[n] denote
the noise power density for the complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at receiver k on the nth
subchannel. The achievable rate for user k can therefore be given by
Rk ≡
N∑
n=1
Rk[n] =
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1 +
pk[n]
σk[n] + Ik[n]
)
=
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1 +
pk[n]
ck[n]
)
, (2)
where σk[n] , Nk[n]|Hkk[n]|2 is the normalized noise power on subchannel n, Ik[n] =
∑K
i=1
i6=k
pi[n]θik[n] is the total
interference power on subchannel n for user k, with θik[n] , |Hik[n]|
2
|Hkk[n]|2 denoting the normalized (by user
k) channel power gain from transmitter (or interference) i to receiver k, and ck[n] , σk[n] + Ik[n]. For
transmitter k, it possesses only the knowledge of local CSI which corresponds to {ck[n]} for all n.
B. Input-Output Subsystem: Environmental Interference Derivative
In this setup, users are all uncoordinated individuals and each user will allocate its power over the sub-
carriers to maximize its own rate based on its observation of the environment and its belief on how the
environment would react to its action. The environment user k observes can change because other users
may alter their strategies to respond to the environmental changes caused by its own action. As such, it is
a dynamic process where users all interact and could converge to a compromised equilibrium such as NE.
To model this interaction, from user k’s viewpoint, we can regard other users as a subsystem which
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takes its power allocation at time t as inputs (i.e., {ptk[n]}) and produces a new interference pattern at
time t+ 1 as outputs (i.e., {It+1k [n]}), as shown in Fig. 2. Under this model, we define the environmental
interference derivative, ϕtk[n] ,
∂It+1k [n]
∂ptk[n]
, which measures the environmental change on a subcarrier seen by
a user, caused by a change in the user’s own power allocation on that subcarrier. This captures the essence
of the overall network response and is a key parameter that determines whether or not such user interaction
converges, and helps develop self-optimized algorithms for achieving desirable equilibriums (e.g., ASE).
C. GWF and Operational Interference Derivative
Let P = {P1,P2, . . . ,PK} be the set of all users’ power allocation strategies and pk ∈ Pk ∀k. We define
p−k , {p1, . . . , pk−1, pk+1, . . . , pK} embracing the power allocation of all users except user k. User k’s
power allocation can be optimized by solving the following rate maximization problem (with t omitted):
p∗k = arg max
pk∈Pk
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1 +
pk[n]
ck[n]
)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
pk[n] ≤ Pk, (3)
which can be solved by a Lagrangian multiplier formulation
L =
N∑
n=1
ln
(
1 +
pk[n]
ck[n]
)
− λ
(
N∑
n=1
pk[n]− Pk
)
(4)
with the Lagrange multiplier λ. To proceed, it can be easily shown that6
∂L
∂pk[n]
=
ϕk[n] + 1
ck[n] + pk[n]
− ϕk[n]
ck[n]
− λ = 1
ηk[n] + pk[n]
− λ, (5)
where
ηk[n] ,
c2k[n] + ϕk[n]p
2
k[n]
ck[n]− ϕk[n]pk[n] (6)
is the “interactive” network noise due to pk[n] through the environmental interference derivative.
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality suggest a WF strategy
pk[n] = (wk − ηk[n])+, (7)
6The derivation can be done by recognizing that ϕ+1
c+p
− ϕ
c
= 1(c+p)c
c−ϕp
= 1(c+p)c
c−ϕp −p+p
= 1
c2+ϕp2
c−ϕp +p
.
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where (a)+ = max(0, a) and wk =
c2k[n]+ϕk[n]p
2
k[n]
ck[n]−ϕk[n]pk[n] + pk[n], for pk[n] > 0, is chosen to satisfy the user’s
power constraint
∑
n pk[n] ≤ Pk, and interpreted as the “water-level” of the solution. Incorporating the
interactive nature of the system, the optimal power allocation for user k can be realized by
ptk[n] =
(
wtk −
(
ctk[n]
)2
+ ϕtk[n]
(
pt−1k [n]
)2
ctk[n]− ϕtk[n]pt−1k [n]
)+
. (8)
As a result, to use the above solution (8), the user needs to have a belief on how the environment would
react, an operational interference derivative, or a belief on ϕtk[n], denoted as ϕ˜k[n]. For instance, NE is
defined such that at the equilibrium (with the corresponding parameters marked with ∗) it satisfies
Rk(p
∗
k, p
∗
−k) ≥ Rk(pk, p∗−k) ∀k. (9)
Since the rate maximization for an NE user is performed with respect to some fixed interference pattern,
{Ik(p∗−k)[n]}, each user has a belief that the environment will remain static following a change of its power
allocation strategy. In other words, ϕ˜k[n] = 0, leading to the well-known simultaneous WF [14]
ptk[n] =
(
wtk − ctk[n]
)+ ∀k. (10)
The operational interference derivative is the key to which user’s foresightedness can be nurtured. By
a proper choice of the operational interference derivative it is possible to create a free OFDMA game for
approaching a more desirable equilibrium, which we will address next. It is worth emphasizing that the
GWF in (7) is fundamentally different from the modified WF in [20]. The main difference is that in our
GWF there is an interactiveness through ηk[n] which does not exist in the WF in [20].
III. SE and Its Free Game Realization
A. New Key Results of NE
Depending on how users react to the environmental changes, the system may converge to an equilibrium.
Throughout, we use the superscript ∗ to denote the parameters at the equilibrium so the overall strategy
is P∗ = {p∗k, p∗−k}. NE systems are Pareto-inefficient [7–10, 14], which has motivated the concept of SE
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in which there can be foresighted users who can maximize their rates more effectively by knowing other
myopic users’ actions. In light of this, this paper aims to devise self-optimization methods that can lead
the OFDMA game to an SE. To do so, we first develop some new results of NE and consider the scenario
where user κ is the user of interest and other users, for i 6= κ, are at NE, with user i’s power allocation
denoted by NEi(pκ) = {NEi(pκ)[1], . . . , NEi(pκ)[N ]}, which is a function of user κ’s power allocation.
Lemma 1 The rate of change of the power allocation for user i with respect to that for user κ is given by
∂NEi(pκ)[n]sgn(pi[n])
∂pκ[n]
= −θκisgn(pi[n]), (11)
where sgn(x) returns one if x > 0 or zero if x ≤ 0.
Proof: First, assume that pi[n] > 0. Then, by chain rule, we have
∂NEi(pκ)[n]
∂pκ[n]
=
∂NEi(pκ)[n]
∂Ii[n]
∂Ii(pκ)[n]
∂pκ[n]
. (12)
As user i is using an NE strategy, we have, from (10), that pi[n] = NEi(pκ)[n] = wi−σi[n]− Ii[n] > 0 and
therefore, ∂NEi(pκ)[n]∂Ii[n] = −1. On the other hand, by definition, we have
∂Ii[n]
∂pκ[n]
= θκi[n]. Finally, note that
if pi[n] = 0, the rate of change will be zero. Therefore, (11) is obtained, which completes the proof. 
Lemma 2 The environmental interference derivative for an NE subsystem is given by7
∂Iκ(NE−κ(pκ))[n]
∂pκ[n]
= −
K∑
i=1
i 6=κ
θκi[n]θiκ[n]sgn(pi[n]) ≤ 0, (13)
where NE−κ(pκ) , {NE1(pκ), . . . ,NEκ−1(pκ),NEκ+1(pκ), . . . ,NEK(pκ)}.
Proof: Noting that Iκ[n] =
∑
i 6=κ pi[n]θiκ[n] =
∑
i 6=κNEi(pκ)[n]θiκ[n], we have
∂Iκ(NE−κ(pκ))[n]
∂pκ[n]
=
∂
(∑
i 6=κNEi(pκ)[n]θiκ[n]
)
∂pκ[n]
=
K∑
i=1
i 6=κ
θiκ[n]
∂NEi(pκ)[n]
∂pκ[n]
. (14)
Then, the final result can be obtained by substituting the result of Lemma 1. 
7The notation Iκ(NE−κ(pκ))[n] illustrates that the interference seen by user κ, Iκ[n], is a result of the power allocation
from other users, NE−κ, which is caused by the power allocation of user κ, pκ.
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Theorem 1 NE is unique in the OFDMA game if the environmental interference derivative satisfies
ϕk[n] =
∂Ik(NE−k(pk))[n]
∂pk[n]
> −1, for all pk and for all k, n. (15)
Proof: To prove the result, it suffices to show that w∗k is unique for all k, and we are not interested in
those p∗k[n] = 0 because they do not cause interference to others nor consume any power budget.
At NE, for p∗k[n] > 0, we have
w∗k = p
∗
k[n] + c
∗
k[n]. (16)
Then, the relationship between the water-level and the optimal power allocation can be studied by dif-
ferentiating w∗k with respect to p
∗
k[n] which gives
∂w∗k
∂p∗k[n]
= 1 + ϕ∗k[n]. If (15) is true, or ϕ
∗
k[n] > −1, then
∂w∗k
∂p∗k[n]
> 0. In other words, if we have two water-levels such that wk < w˜k, then their respective power
allocations will satisfy
∑
n pk[n] <
∑
n p˜k[n]. Hence, there is a unique w
∗
k such that
∑
n p
∗
k[n] = Pk. 
Corollary 1 Denoting θ¯ = maxi,k θki, a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of NE is
θ¯ <
1√
K − 1 . (17)
Proof: If (17) is true, then 1 > (K − 1)θ¯2 > ∑Ki=1
i 6=κ
θκi[n]θiκ[n]sgn(pi[n]), which implies that ϕk[n] =
−∑Ki=1
i6=κ
θκi[n]θiκ[n]sgn(pi[n]) > −1. As a result, according to Theorem 1, NE is unique. 
Theorem 1 provides a new way for analyzing the uniqueness of the equilibrium of an OFDMA game
through the environmental interference derivative. On the other hand, comparing to the literature requiring
θ¯ < 1K−1 [7, 23–25], Corollary 1 provides a less stringent sufficient condition for the uniqueness of NE.
B. OSE and A Free Game Implementation
Definition 1 For OSE where user κ is a foresighted user and the rest are myopic followers, we have

Rκ(p
∗
κ,NE−κ(p
∗
κ)) ≥ Rκ(pκ,NE−κ(pκ)),
Rk(p
∗
k, p
∗
−k(p
∗
k)) ≥ Rk(pk, p∗−k(p∗k)) ∀k 6= κ.
(18)
The OSE above, as defined in the conventional fashion, is by nature a bi-level game for the foresighted
user κ because the action user κ takes is expecting an NE response over the rest of the users, as seen in
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(18). Clearly, the non-Stackelberg users (k 6= κ) are myopic and play the game as in NE. In the following,
we will study the environmental property of OSE and use it to create a free game version of OSE.
Theorem 2 Given the foresighted user κ in OSE, we have
ϕ∗κ[n] ≥ −
c∗κ[n]
2c∗κ[n] + p∗κ[n]
. (19)
Proof: Given that at OSE, we have p∗κ, we now consider a power allocation strategy, p˜κ, such that
p˜κ[l] = p
∗
κ[l] ∀l 6= m,n, but p˜κ[n] = p∗κ[n] + ∆p and p˜κ[m] = p∗κ[m] − ∆p for some 1 ≤ m 6= n ≤ N and
small ∆p > 0. Denote the interference patterns for p∗κ and p˜κ, respectively, as Iκ and I˜κ. Using Lemma 2,
we can write I˜κ[n] = Iκ[n] −∆I[n] and I˜κ[m] = Iκ[m] + ∆I[m] for some small ∆I[n] and ∆I[m] > 0. As
user κ’s rate is maximized by p∗κ at OSE, we therefore have Rκ(p˜κ)−Rκ(p∗κ) ≤ 0 implying
log2
(
1 +
p∗κ[n] + ∆p
σκ[n] + I∗κ[n]−∆I[n]
)
− log2
(
1 +
p∗κ[n]
σκ[n] + I∗κ[n]
)
+ log2
(
1 +
p∗κ[m]−∆p
σκ[m] + I∗κ[m] + ∆I[m]
)
− log2
(
1 +
p∗κ[m]
σκ[m] + I∗κ[m]
)
≤ 0. (20)
This can further be simplified to
(
σκ[n] + I
∗
κ[n]−∆I[n] + p∗κ[n] + ∆p
σκ[n] + I∗κ[n]−∆I[n]
)(
σκ[n] + I
∗
κ[n]
σκ[n] + I∗κ[n] + p∗κ[n]
)
×
(
σκ[m] + I
∗
κ[m] + ∆I[m] + p
∗
κ[m]−∆p
σκ[m] + I∗κ[m] + ∆I[m]
)(
σκ[m] + I
∗
κ[m]
σκ[m] + I∗κ[m] + p∗κ[m]
)
≤ 1. (21)
Now, using (21) and noting that it is valid also after swapping m and n because subchannel indices m and
n are arbitrary, it can be easily shown after some manipulations that
(
1− (∆I[n]−∆p)
2
(σκ[n] + I∗κ[n] + p∗κ[n])2
)(
1− (∆I[m]−∆p)
2
(σκ[m] + I∗κ[m] + p∗κ[m])2
)
≤
(
1− ∆I[n]
2
(σκ[n] + I∗κ[n])2
)(
1− ∆I[m]
2
(σκ[m] + I∗κ[m])2
)
∀m,n, (22)
⇒ |∆p−∆I[n]|
σκ[n] + I
∗
κ[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
c∗κ[n]
+p∗κ[n]
≥ ∆I[n]
σκ[n] + I∗κ[n]
⇒
∣∣∣∣∆I[n]∆p
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c∗κ[n]2c∗κ[n] + p∗κ[n] ∀n. (23)
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Taking the limit ∆p→ 0 and knowing that ϕ∗κ[n] ≤ 0 (Lemma 2), we get the desired result of (19). 
Theorem 3 As long as the environmental interference derivative exists, ϕκ[n], OSE is unique.
Proof: From our GWF analysis, for p∗κ[n] > 0, we have w∗κ = η∗κ[n] + p∗κ[n] which gives
w =
c2 + ϕp2
c− ϕp + p (24)
where the indices κ and n as well as the superscript ∗ are omitted for convenience. In [16, Proposition 1],
it is known that in OSE, ϕ is a constant and hence ∂ϕ∂p = 0. Then,
∂w
∂p can be derived as
∂w
∂p
=
(c− ϕp)(2cϕ+ 2pϕ)− (c2 + ϕp2)(ϕ− ϕ)
(c− ϕp)2 + 1 (25)
=
2cϕ+ ϕp+ c
c− ϕp . (26)
Because ϕ ≤ 0 (Lemma 2), we have c− ϕp > 0. From Theorem 2, we also have ϕ ≥ − c2c+p . Therefore,
∂w
∂p
≥
(
− c2c+p
)
(2c+ p) + c
> 0
= 0. (27)
Using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 1, w∗κ is unique and so does OSE. 
Also, from our GWF formulation in Section II-C, we know that ∂L∂p∗κ[n] =
1
w∗κ
− λ which further gives
∂2L
∂(p∗κ[n])2
= −
(
1
w∗κ
)2 ∂w∗κ
∂p∗κ[n]
. (28)
From the proof of Theorem 3, we have already known that ∂w
∗
κ
∂p∗κ[n]
≥ 0. As a consequence, ∂2L
∂(p∗κ[n])2
≤ 0,
which is a sufficient condition for optimality of p∗κ[n] for maximizing user κ’s achievable rate.
The environmental interference derivative property of OSE in Theorem 2 is key to developing a free
OSE game for self-optimization of OFDMA. To do so, we first create an artificial OFDMA game where
user κ is foresighted and other users are myopic, and the environmental interference derivative, φ, meets
φ∗κ[n] = −
1
2 + p
∗
κ[n]
c∗κ[n]
≤ ϕ∗κ[n] ≤ 0. (29)
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The above artificial game will approach the bi-level OSE game if p
∗
κ[n]
c∗κ[n]
is large for all n such that p∗κ[n] > 0
because φ∗κ[n] → ϕ∗κ[n]. In this case, the optimal power allocation for both games will be identical. We
conjecture that for NK > 1, there will be a strong tendency that foresighted user κ will own the subcarriers
that it chooses to occupy and in so doing on those chosen subcarriers p
∗
κ[n]
c∗κ[n]
will be large and as a result the
artificial game provides an accurate representation of the original bi-level OSE game.
Inspired by this, we propose to use the GWF by choosing the operational interference derivative (i.e.,
the belief of the environmental interference derivative) for foresighted user κ as (see also Section II-C)
ϕ˜∗κ[n] = −
c∗κ[n]
2c∗κ[n] + p∗κ[n]
, or operationally, ϕ˜tκ[n] = −
ctκ[n]
2ctκ[n] + p
t−1
κ [n]
. (30)
Therefore, we have the following free game for approaching the OSE.
Proposition 1 A free OSE game lets users iteratively and simultaneously optimize their strategies using
GWF with user κ choosing (30) and other myopic users choosing ϕ˜k[n] = 0 ∀k 6= κ so that

ptκ[n] =
(
wtκ −
(
ctκ[n]
)2
+ ϕ˜tκ[n]
(
pt−1κ [n]
)2
ctκ[n]− ϕ˜tκ[n]pt−1κ [n]
)+
, where ϕ˜tκ[n] in (30),
ptk[n] =
(
wtk − ctk[n]
)+
, for k 6= κ.
(31)
With the operational interference derivative (30), user κ in this free game does not need to wait for an
NE response of the rest of the users while adapting its power allocation strategy, and the equilibrium of
the free game can be achieved by simultaneous GWF in any arbitrary order.
Theorem 4 If ϕ∗κ[n] =
∂I∗κ[n]
∂p∗κ[n]
> −0.5, the free OSE game has a unique equilibrium and the GWF in (31)
achieves the unique equilibrium which is also the global optimum for maximizing user κ’s rate.
Proof: With the operational interference derivative (30) in GWF, we have, for p∗κ[n] > 0, that
w∗κ =
(c∗κ[n])2 + c∗κ[n]p∗κ[n]
c∗κ[n]− ϕ˜∗κ[n]p∗κ[n]
= c∗κ[n] +
p∗κ[n]
2
. (32)
Therefore, if ϕ∗κ[n] > −0.5, then we get
∂w∗κ
∂p∗κ[n]
= ϕ∗κ[n] +
1
2
≥ 0. (33)
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Since ∂w
∗
κ
∂p∗κ[n]
≥ 0 implies that w∗k is unique, the equilibrium of the free game is unique. For the same reason,
as shown in (28) previously, we have ∂
2L
∂(p∗κ[n])2
≤ 0 and therefore, p∗κ[n] obtained by the GWF in (31) will
converge to the unique equilibrium and is the global optimum under the condition ϕ∗κ[n] > −0.5. 
Unlike the bi-level game, in the free game, ϕκ[n] =
∂Iκ[n]
∂pκ[n]
6= ∂Iκ(NE−κ(pκ))[n]∂pκ[n] because the interference
seen by user κ is no longer the outcome of the NE response of all the myopic users. Also, within the free
game, it does not seem possible to know the exact value for ϕκ[n] =
∂Iκ[n]
∂pκ[n]
. However, the way the free
game is carried out is based on the belief that the interference derivative has the property (31) which is
the property that permits the free game to approach the bi-level OSE. In this belief, ϕ˜κ[n] > −0.5.
C. ASE, Its Variants and A Free Game Implementation
Definition 2 Users can all be completely foresighted and in this ASE, we have
Rk(p
∗
k,ASE−k(p
∗
k)) ≥ Rk(pk,ASE−k(pk)) ∀k, (34)
where ASE−k(·) corresponds to the ASE strategies from all other users except user k and is defined similarly
as NE−k(·) used previously. Under this definition, ASE is a multilevel game with (K − 1) levels.
Note that (34) is the ultimate definition for ASE with complete foresightedness for all users. However,
under (34), users strategies are strongly coupled together and it is not known if this is achievable, if not
impossible. This partly explains why in [18] foresighted leaders are not supposed to be foresighted with
each other and as a consequence in the case of ASE, users become myopic, losing their foresightedness
capability. Motivated by our OSE results, instead, one could define ASE in the following way.
Definition 3 Users are all foresighted with the belief that others are myopic. In this ASE, we have
Rk(p
∗
k, N˜E−k(p
∗
k)) ≥ Rk(pk, N˜E−k(pk)) ∀k, (35)
where N˜E−k indicates that user k believes that other users will come to an NE in response to its action.
In (35), although users are not foresighted to each other, they are foresighted to some belief of the
overall network response. In particular, every user has the belief that all other users are myopic and give
an NE response to its action. This version of ASE is a natural extension to OSE and can be interpreted
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as having K interfered OSE games. The main issue of (35) is that the construction of the game is limited
to “foresighted-myopic” interaction and the OSE games will interfere with each other, whereas in ASE one
would expect to facilitate “foresighted-foresighted” interaction, which is the major challenge. To nurture
the required “foresighted-foresighted” exchange, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5 The environmental interference derivatives for ASE, {ϕ∗k[n]}, satisfy
ϕ∗k[n] =
K∑
i=1
i6=k
θki[n]θik[n]sgn(p
∗
i [n])
ϕ∗i [n]
. (36)
Proof: First, by definition, we have
ϕ∗k[n] =
∂I∗k [n]
∂p∗k[n]
=
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])θik[n]
∂p∗i [n]
∂p∗k[n]
=
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])θik[n]
∂p∗i [n]
∂I∗i [n]
∂I∗i [n]
∂p∗k[n]
, (37)
in which
∂p∗i [n]
∂I∗i [n]
=
(
∂I∗i [n]
∂p∗i [n]
)−1
= (ϕ∗i [n])
−1, and ∂I
∗
i [n]
∂p∗k[n]
= θki[n]. As such, the property (36) is obtained. 
Theorem 5 provides a key property of ASE which facilitates the exchanges of foresightedness between
users. With this result, Definition 3 in (35) can go beyond a group of interfered OSEs to become a group
of foresighted OSEs. We will show that it is possible to gain insight from the property (36) so that
self-optimization OFDMA can be achieved. Before we address this, the following lemmas are useful.
Lemma 3 With user k believing that other users (` 6= k) are myopic, we have
∑
` 6=k
θ`k[n]θk`[n]sgn(p
∗
` [n]) ≤
c∗k[n]
2c∗k[n] + p
∗
k[n]
. (38)
Proof: Based on the belief of user k, we start by writing
∆I∗k [n]
∆p∗k[n]
as
∆I∗k [n]
∆p∗k[n]
(a)
=
∑
6`=k
θ`k[n]
∆p∗` [n]
∆I∗` [n]
∆I∗` [n]
∆p∗k[n]
sgn(p∗` [n])
(b)
≥ − c
∗
k[n]
2c∗k[n] + p
∗
k[n]
, (39)
where (a) is by definition and (b) is due to (19) (true as long as the rate at the equilibrium is the highest).
Now, knowing
∆p∗` [n]
∆I∗` [n]
= −1 (as in the proof of Lemma 1) and ∆I∗` [n]∆p∗k[n] = θk` yield the result (38). 
Proposition 2 For a self-optimized OFDMA network where each user knows only its local CSI, the envi-
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ronmental interference derivative for user k to achieve ASE (Definition 3) should satisfy
ϕ∗k[n] ≥ −
√
c∗k[n]
2c∗k[n] + p
∗
k[n]
∀k, n. (40)
Proof: Note that (36) is true only if p∗k[n] > 0 because otherwise the subchannel is not used and
p∗k[n] = 0. Therefore, more precisely, if θij [n] , 0 for i = j, then we have
K∑
k=1
ϕ∗k[n]
(a)
=
K∑
k=1
sgn(p∗k[n])
ϕ∗k[n]
K∑
`=1
θk`[n]θ`k[n]sgn(p
∗
` [n]) (41a)
(b)
≤
K∑
k=1
sgn(p∗k[n])
ϕ∗k[n]
(
c∗k[n]
2c∗k[n] + p
∗
k[n]
)
, (41b)
where (a) is due to summing both sides of (36) over all k and (b) is due to the result in Lemma 3. With
self-optimization in mind that each user should operate based on only its local CSI observation, i.e., {ck[n]}
for user k, the above property can be enforced by comparing term-by-term on both sides giving rise to
ϕ∗k[n] ≤
sgn(p∗k[n])
ϕ∗k[n]
(
c∗k[n]
2c∗k[n] + p
∗
k[n]
)
⇒ −
√
c∗k[n]
2c∗k[n] + p
∗
k[n]
≤ ϕ∗k[n] ≤ 0. (42)
Note that the negative is chosen to give (40) because ϕ∗k[n] ≤ 0. 
It is worth emphasizing that (41b) and hence (40) is a weaker environmental interference derivative
property for ASE which is a result deduced from the original property (36) but satisfying (40) does not
necessarily imply (36). Nonetheless, it does bring the possibility of network foresightedness based on local
channel observation and will therefore make self-optimization realizable by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A free ASE game can be constructed by simultaneous GWF such that
ptk[n] =
(
wtk −
(
ctk[n]
)2
+ ϕ˜tk[n]
(
pt−1k [n]
)2
ctk[n]− ϕ˜tk[n]pt−1k [n]
)+
, where ϕ˜tk[n] = −
√
ctk[n]
2ctk[n] + p
t−1
k [n]
∀k. (43)
The above free ASE game proposed follows the same rationale behind the free OSE game described
before. In particular, the operational interference derivative for carrying out GWF is chosen to satisfy the
environmental interference derivative property of ASE (40) with equality on the basis of approaching the
original multilevel ASE at high SNRs. Furthermore, being a free game, the equilibrium can be achieved
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by simultaneous GWF in any order. The following theorem addresses the uniqueness of the free game.
Theorem 6 If ϕ∗k[n] > −
c∗k[n]
4c∗k[n]+p
∗
k[n]
∀k, n such that p∗k[n] > 0, the free ASE game has a unique equilibrium
and the GWF in (43) achieves the unique equilibrium and is also optimal for rate maximization.
Proof: To begin, we find it useful to define γ∗k [n] =
√
2c∗k[n]+p
∗
k[n]
c∗k[n]
so that ϕ˜∗k[n] = − 1γ∗k [n] due to the
GWF in (43) and p∗k[n] = (γ
∗
k [n])
2c∗k[n]− 2c∗k[n]. Then, for those k, n such that p∗k[n] > 0, we have
w∗k[n] =
(c∗k[n])
2 + c∗k[n]p
∗
k[n]
c∗k[n]− ϕ˜∗k[n]p∗k[n]
=
c∗k[n]γ
∗
k [n](γ
∗
k [n] + 1)
γ∗k [n] + 2
. (44)
To see how w∗k[n] varies with respect to p
∗
k[n], we first obtain
∂γ∗k [n]
∂p∗k[n]
=
1
2
1√
2 +
p∗k[n]
c∗k[n]
∂
(
p∗k[n]
c∗k[n]
)
∂p∗k[n]
=
1
2
1√
2 +
p∗k[n]
c∗k[n]
1
c∗k[n]
(
1− p
∗
k[n]ϕ
∗
k[n]
c∗k[n]
)
≥ 0 (∵ ϕ∗k[n] ≤ 0). (45)
Therefore, γ∗k [n] increases as p
∗
k[n] increases. On the other hand,
∂
(
γ∗k [n]+1
γ∗
k
[n]+2
)
∂γ∗k [n]
= 1
(γ∗k [n]+2)2
> 0 and hence if
p∗k[n] increases, then γ
∗
k [n] will increase and therefore
γ∗k [n]+1
γ∗k [n]+2
will increase accordingly.
It remains to show that c∗k[n]γ
∗
k [n] is also increasing with p
∗
k[n]. To do so, we note that c
∗
k[n]γ
∗
k [n] =√
2(c∗k[n])2 + p
∗
k[n]c
∗
k[n]. As a consequence, if ϕ
∗
k[n] > −
c∗k[n]
4c∗k[n]+p
∗
k[n]
is satisfied, we obtain
∂c∗k[n]γ
∗
k [n]
∂p∗k[n]
=
1
2
1√
2(c∗k[n])2 + p
∗
k[n]c
∗
k[n]
[(4c∗k[n] + p
∗
k[n])ϕ
∗
k[n] + c
∗
k[n]] > 0. (46)
As a result, under the aforementioned condition, w∗k[n] is increasing with p
∗
k[n] and hence the power
constraint
∑
n p
∗
k[n]. Following the same argument as before, w
∗
k and hence the free ASE game is unique.
From (28), the equilibrium is also optimal in maximizing the user’s rate, which completes the proof. 
IV. Convergence Analysis
The power-interference game can be generally analyzed by recognizing that

∆ptk = ρ
t
k∆I
t
k, for some ρ
t
k ≤ 0 (observe and action; GWF reoptimization),
∆It+1k = ϕ
t
k∆p
t
k, for some ϕ
t
k ≤ 0 (action and reaction; environmental response),
(47)
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where the subcarrier index n is omitted for convenience. In what follows, we can write
∆It+1k = ϕ
t
k∆p
t
k =
∑
i 6=k
∆ptiθik, (48)
∆pt+1k = ρ
t+1
k ∆I
t+1
k = ρ
t+1
k ϕ
t
k∆p
t
k = ρ
t+1
k
∑
i 6=k
∆ptiθik. (49)
Convergence can take place in two possible cases: (i) |∆pt+1k | < |∆ptk| for all t ≥ t0 for some t0 > 0,
and (ii) |∆pt+1k | > |∆ptk| for all t ≥ t0 for some t0 > 0, the latter of which belongs to the case of strong
interference channel. To proceed, we define |∆pt| , maxk |∆ptk|, |∆pt| , mink |∆ptk|, |ρt| , maxk |ρtk|,
|ρt| , mink |ρtk|, |θ| , maxi 6=j |θij | and |θ| , mini 6=j |θij |. Our objective here is to illustrate that it is
possible to obtain sufficient conditions for convergence on the channel parameters |θ| and |θ|.
To have (i), we start by expressing
|∆pt+1| (a)= max
k
∣∣∣∣∣∣ρt+1k
∑
i 6=k
∆ptiθik
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |ρt+1||∆pt|θ(K − 1), (50)
where (a) is due to (49). Therefore, a sufficient condition for convergence is to have
|ρt+1|θ(K − 1) < 1⇒ θ < 1
(K − 1)|ρt+1| (51)
because this will guarantee |∆pt+1| < |∆pt| ∀k, leading to ∆p∞k = 0 ∀k.
On the other hand, for (ii) |∆pt+1k | > |∆ptk|, this will converge as well since |∆ptk| is finite due to the
total power constraint, Pk. This can be interpreted as the scenario where a user, say k, decides to allocate
all its power to given subcarriers (if ∆ptk > 0) or to withdraw all its power (if ∆p
t
k < 0). The former
illustrates the case that user k wants to own the subcarriers and other users will have a strong tendency
to leave the subcarriers due to severe interference caused by user k. A natural consequence is that those
subcarriers will be occupied by user k only, and hence, ϕtk = 0, resulting the strong interference channel
studied in [21, 22]. To obtain a sufficient condition for such convergence, we consider
|∆pt+1k | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ρt+1k
∑
i 6=k
∆ptiθik
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ |ρt+1||∆pt|θ ∀k, (52)
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where we have used the fact that {∆pti}∀i are all of the same sign (all positive or all negative). As such, it
will converge to a strong interference channel if
|ρt+1|θ > 1⇒ θ > 1|ρt+1| . (53)
Fig. 3 illustrates the convergence regions based on the two sufficient conditions above.
Based on the convergence regions described above, the convergence behaviors of various equilibriums
can be analyzed by understanding ρtk. In particular, we know that for p
t
k > 0, we have
ρtk =
∆ptk
∆Itk
=
∆(wtk − ηtk)+
∆Itk
= −∆η
t
k
∆Itk
= −∆η
t
k
∆ctk
. (54)
As a result, we have the following lemma for evaluating ρtk of NE, OSE and ASE.
Lemma 4 Based on (54), it can be derived that
|ρtk| =
∣∣∣∣∆ηtk∆ctk
∣∣∣∣ =

1 if ϕ˜tk = 0 (NE),
1 if ϕ˜tk = −
ctk
2ctk+p
t−1
k
(OSE with user k as leader),
1
2
√
pt−1k
ctk
if ϕ˜tk = −
√
ctk
2ctk+p
t−1
k
when
pt−1k
ctk
is large (ASE).
(55)
Proof: In this proof, for convenience, we will omit the subcarrier index n, the user index k and the
iteration index t. Also, we note that |ρ| = ∂η∂I = ∂η∂c . For NE, η = c and therefore |ρ| = 1.
In the case of OSE, using (6) and the corresponding definition of ϕ˜ in OSE, we have
η =
c2 +
(
− c2c+p
)
p2
c+ c2c+pp
= c− p
2
⇒ |ρ| = 1. (56)
We start our analysis for the case of ASE by expressing
∂η
∂c
=
c2 − 2cϕ˜p+ c∂ϕ˜∂c p2 − ϕ˜p2 + c2 ∂ϕ˜∂c p
(c− ϕ˜p)2 . (57)
On the other hand, we can also examine ∂ϕ˜∂c to obtain
∂ϕ˜
∂c
=
1
2ϕ˜
c2
(2c+ p)2
p
c2
=
1
2
ϕ˜3
p
c2
. (58)
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Substituting this result into (57) then gives
∂η
∂c
=
c2 − 2cϕ˜p+ 12 ϕ˜3 p
3
c − ϕ˜p2 + 12 ϕ˜3p2
(c− ϕ˜p)2 . (59)
Now, for p  c or large pc , we have ϕ˜ = −
√
c
2c+p ≈ −
√
c
p . Consequently, |ρ| = ∂η∂c ≈ 12 ϕ˜pc = 12
√
p
c . This
completes the proof and knowing |ρ| will be useful in understanding the convergence behavior. 
For NE, |ρtk| = 1 and a sufficient condition for convergence is θ < 1K−1 , as reported in [7, 23–25]. Also,
our analysis shows that θ > 1 will ensure convergence as well and in this case a given subcarrier will be
occupied by one user only, which aligns with the result for the Gaussian strong interference channel in
[21, 22]. Since |ρtk| = 1 for OSE, it has the same convergence behavior as NE.
For ASE, as opposed to NE and OSE, |ρtk| can take very different values depending on
pt−1k
ctk
. Particularly,
if
pt−1k
ctk
is large, then |ρtk| will be very large and therefore convergence will tend to occur on the second region
θ & 0, in which case according to our analysis users at the equilibrium will be made orthogonal.
V. Simulation Results
In this section, we provide simulation results of the sum-rates achieved by the proposed algorithms. The
iterative spectrum balancing (ISB) method in [5], which is a near-optimal centralized algorithm, is used as a
performance upper bound. First, we consider an example 2-user 2-subcarrier network (i.e., K = 2, N = 2)
[15] where σ1[1] = σ2[2] = 4, σ1[2] = σ2[1] = 1, θ12[1] = θ12[2] = θ21[1] = θ21[2] = 0.5, P1 = P2 = 10 so that

R1 = R1[1] +R1[2] = log2
(
1 +
p1[1]
4 + 0.5p2[1]
)
+ log2
(
1 +
p1[2]
1 + 0.5p2[2]
)
,
R2 = R2[1] +R2[2] = log2
(
1 +
p2[1]
1 + 0.5p1[1]
)
+ log2
(
1 +
p2[2]
4 + 0.5p1[2]
)
.
(60)
The solutions for NE, OSE and ASE (due to Definition 2 in (34)) can be easily derived analytically as
NE:

p1[1] = 2,
p1[2] = 8,
p2[1] = 8,
p2[2] = 2,
OSE:

p1[1] = 0,
p1[2] = 10,
p2[1] = 9,
p2[2] = 1,
and ASE:

p1[1] = 0,
p1[2] = 10,
p2[1] = 10,
p2[2] = 0.
(61)
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The simulation results for this channel are given in Table 1, where it is observed that the proposed
iterative GWF algorithm can be used to take users to the equilibria of interest. In particular, ASE tends
to put the users into orthogonal subchannels and achieves the highest user rates.
Next, we provide simulation results averaged over a large number of independent channel realizations.
In the simulations, we model each subcarrier channel by an equal-power four-ray Rayleigh fading channel
(see Fig. 4) [26], i.e., |Hij [n]|2 = |h(1)ij [n]|2 + |h(2)ij [n]|2 + |h(3)ij [n]|2 + |h(4)ij [n]|2, ∀i, j, and we assume that
E[|Hij [n]|2] = x and E[|h(`)ij [n]|2] = 0.25x ∀`, for i 6= j. For i = j, we set E[|Hkk[n]|2] = 1 and E[|h(`)kk [n]|2] =
0.25 ∀`. Hence, x is the parameter that measures the relative severeness of the interference channel.
Table 2 provides results showing the likelihood of convergence for different games with Pk = 100 ∀k
and Nk[n] = 0.01 ∀k, n. As shown, there is a small percentage of cases where NE and OSE diverge and
as the number of users increases, this will become more problematic. In contrast, ASE always converges
except when x is small meaning that the channel has only very weak crosstalk. This is because for small
x, noise becomes the dominant effect which does not react to the players’ actions but users in ASE tend
to mistakenly regard the overall noise as interference due to other users. As such, there will be a small
percentage of times (less than 5%) for ASE to diverge. In terms of convergence speed, nevertheless, ASE
generally would take longer to converge than NE and OSE (results not shown here due to space).
In Table 3, results are provided for the average users’ sum-rates for a 3-user 9-subcarrier interference
channel, with Pk = 100 ∀k, Nk[n] = 0.01 ∀k, n and x = 0.4. Results show that there is a considerable gain
in the sum-rates using ASE over NE and OSE. The cumulative density functions for the sum-rate ratios
between ASE and NE users and between OSE and NE users are given in Fig. 5. Results illustrate that
for ASE it is possible to have the sum-rate 5 times greater than what is achieved by NE. Furthermore, we
compare the performance between ASE and ISB [5]. Such results are given in Table 4 where we assumed
Pk = 100 ∀k, Nk[n] = 0.01 ∀k, n and x = 0.4. Results show that the average per-user sum-rate for ASE is
about 90% of that for ISB and is not decreased much when the number of users/subcarriers increases.
To provide a more complete comparison between NE, OSE, ASE and ISB, in Fig. 6, we provide the
average system sum-rate results for various x (which varies the severity of interference between users). A
3-user 9-subcarrier channel with Pk = 100 ∀k, Nk[n] = 0.01 ∀k, n and x from 0.001 to 10 is considered. We
discuss the results by looking into three separate regions: (1) x ≤ 0.03, (2) 0.03 < x ≤ 4 and (3) x > 4. In
Region (1), x is so small that the channel is reduced to K parallel single-user OFDMA channels. In this
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case, users do not interfere with each other and NE, OSE and ASE all achieve sum-rate performance close
to the centralized ISB, with ASE being slightly inferior than NE and OSE. Basically, all the game-theoretic
approaches operate under an assumption that the players’ strategies affect the interference patterns the
users see but for small x, this is no longer true. For this reason, as ASE users are the most aggressive ones
in playing, they are slightly inferior than NE and OSE users. From our convergence analysis in Section
IV, it is understood that the superior performance of ASE is due to the possibility of having a large ρk
leading to convergence in region 2 in Fig. 3. Using (55), for ASE, we can roughly estimate
|ρk[n]| ≈ 1
2
√
Pk
N/K
Nk[n]
= 28.57. (62)
Therefore, for ASE to work well, we need to have θ > 1|ρ| ≈ 0.035 (the dominant sufficient condition for
ASE to converge), which agrees very much with the threshold of x for Region (1).
Region (2) covers the most typical scenarios of interference channels. In this region, the performance
differences between ISB and game-theoretic equilibria become much more significant. In particular, the
sum-rates of NE and OSE are significantly compromised, while ASE is able to achieve the sum-rate close
to that of ISB. Finally, in Region (3), NE, OSE and ASE all appear to converge to the same performance
which is also very close to that for ISB. This is because when x is very large (i.e., the interference links are
much stronger than the desired links), this forces the gaming strategies to completely avoid users sharing
any subcarriers [21, 22]. Consequently, they all perform equally and as well as ISB.
VI. Conclusion
This paper studied the competition properties of an OFDMA channel. By introducing the environmental
and operational interference derivatives, we devised iterative GWF algorithms that can take users to the
ASE, by exploiting local CSI at the users, resulting self-optimized OFDMA. Results revealed that ASE
achieves the average system sum-rate very close to that of ISB, a centralized near-optimal solution.
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Table 1: Simulation results for the 2-user 2-subcarrier deterministic channel.
Equilibrium NE OSE ASE
User k User 1 User 2 User 1 User 2 User 1 User 2
pk[1] 2.00 8.00 0 9.00 0 9.99
pk[2] 8.00 2.00 9.99 1.00 9.99 0
Rate Rk 2.6439 2.6438 2.9386 3.4739 3.4594 3.4594
Table 2: Number of times for divergence in 1000 independent simulations.
(K,N) (3, 9) (4, 16) (5, 15)
Equilibrium NE OSE ASE NE OSE ASE NE OSE ASE
x = 5 0 0 0 5 2 0 9 7 0
x = 0.8 78 58 0 310 251 0 386 323 0
x = 0.5 23 25 0 115 122 0 200 203 0
x = 0.2 0 0 6 0 0 39 0 0 48
Table 3: Average users’ sum-rates for the 3-user 9-subcarrier interference channel.
Sum-rate User 1 User 2 User 3
NE 13.9944 13.8966 13.8021
OSE 16.5275 15.5493 15.4743
ASE 32.6641 32.8518 33.0399
Table 4: The average per-user sum-rates for ASE and ISB.
(K,N) (3, 9) (6, 18) (12, 36)
ASE 32.8414 32.2201 31.6874
ISB 34.6674 35.5500 35.6335
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Figure 1: A multi-user interference channel model.
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Figure 2: The power game subsystem.
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Figure 3: A diagram showing the iterations of the iterative water-filling algorithm.
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Figure 5: A four-ray Rayleigh fading channel model.
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Figure 4: A four-ray Rayleigh fading channel model.
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Figure 6: The average system sum-rate comparison for various x.
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